Trade Secret Preliminary Hearings: Does the Press Have a Right to Know? by Hogan, Thomas M. & Schoenbeck, Ruth C.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 5
January 1987
Trade Secret Preliminary Hearings: Does the Press
Have a Right to Know?
Thomas M. Hogan
Ruth C. Schoenbeck
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Thomas M. Hogan and Ruth C. Schoenbeck, Trade Secret Preliminary Hearings: Does the Press Have a Right to Know?, 3 Santa Clara
High Tech. L.J. 329 (2012).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol3/iss2/5
TRADE SECRET PRELIMINARY HEARINGS:
DOES THE PRESS HAVE A RIGHT
TO KNOW?
Thomas M. Hogan* and Ruth C. Schoenbeck**
I. INTRODUCTION
"James Madison probably did not suppose, on suggesting to
the House of Representatives its inclusion in the Bill of Rights, that
the right to a public trial would one day conflict with someone's
interest in concealing a method for producing a triamino derivative
of symmetrical triazine."' I Nor did Madison probably foresee the
similar conflicts that have arisen between holders of trade secret in-
formation and members of the press. In fact, since at least twenty
states2 have enacted criminal trade secret statutes,3 members of the
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1. Stamicarbon v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 534 (2d Cir. 1974).
2. States that have passed criminal trade secret statutes or have incorporated trade
secrets into their criminal theft statutes include Arkansas (ARKANsAS STAT. ANN. tit 41,
§ 2207 (1975)), California (Cal. Penal Code § 499c (West 1983)), Colorado (COLO. REv.
STAT. tit. 18, § 4408 (1963)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1809 (1968)), Illinois (ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 15-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. tit. 35 § 4342
(Bums 1976)), Massachusetts (MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30 (West 1945)), Michi-
gan (MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.771 (West 1968)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 609.52 (West 1967)), New Hampshire (N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 637.1 (1971)), New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2c, § 202 (West 1978)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 30,
§ 1624 (1967)), New York (N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.00, 155.30, 165.07 (McKinney 1967)),
Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1333.51 (Page 1967)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1732 (1968)), Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3930 (Purdon 1973)),
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 31126), Washington State (RCW 9A.56.010) and Wisconsin
(Wis STAT. ANN. § 943.205 (West 1978)).
3. For example, the California criminal trade secret statute in Penal Code Section
499c(b) (West 1983) states:
(b) Every person is guilty of theft who, with intent to deprive or withhold
from the owner thereof the control of a trade secret, or with an intent to appro-
priate a trade secret to his or her own use or to the use of another does any of
the following:
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press and owners of trade secrets4 will inevitably clash over whether
the press has a constitutional right to attend criminal trade secret
preliminary hearings.5
A company seeking to protect its trade secrets can either em-
ploy the civil courts, or more recently, can use the criminal courts if
the company is doing business- in a state which has enacted a crimi-
nal trade secret statute. Companies prefer criminal prosecution for
a variety of reasons. A primary reason is that a search pursuant to
a warrant can provide valuable evidence of the violation, and in
some instances, stop the crime if the trade secret consists of a physi-
cal object. Additionally, a criminal trade secret case is handled by a
(1) Steals, takes, carries away, or uses without authorization a trade secret.
(2) Fraudulently appropriates any article representing a trade secret en-
trusted to-him.
(3) Having unlawfully obtained access to the article, without authority makes
or causes to be made a copy of any article representing a trade secret.
(4) Having obtained access to the article through a relationship of trust and
confidence, without authority and in breach of the obligations created by such
relationship makes or causes to be made, directly from and in the presence of
the article, a copy of any article representing a trade secret.
(c) Every person who promises or offers or gives, or conspires to promise or
offer to give, to any present or former agent, employee or servant of another a
benefit as an inducement, bribe or reward for conveying, delivering or other-
wise making available an article representing a trade secret owned by his or her
present or former principal, employer or master, to any person not authorized
by such owner to receive or acquire the same and every person who being a
present or former agent, employee, or servant, solicits, accepts, receives or
takes a benefit as an inducement, bribe or reward for conveying, delivering or
otherwise making available an article representing a trade secret owned by his
or her present or former principal, employer or master, to any person not au-
thorized by such owner to receive or acquire the same is punishable by impris-
onment in the state prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine
not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both such fine and such
imprisonment.
(d) In a prosecution for a violation of this section it shall be no defense that
the person so charged, returned or intended to return the article.
4. A trade secret is a formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is
used in one's business and which gives one an opportunity to obtain advantage over its com-
petitors who do not know or use it. RESTATEMENT OF Tors § 757 (1934).
Cal. Penal Code § 499c(a)(9) (1983) defines a trade secret as follows:
"Trade secret" means the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or
technical information, design, process, procedure, formula, computer program
or information stored in a computer, information in transit, or improvement
which is secret and is not generally available to the public, and which gives one
who uses it an advantage over competitors who do not know of or use the trade
secret; and a trade secret shall be presumed to be secret when the owner thereof
takes measures to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than
those selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes.
5. During the preliminary hearing the state "is required to produce sufficient evidence
to establish that there is probable cause to believe (a) that a crime has been committed, and
(b) that the defendant committed it. Black's Law Dictionary 1062 (5th ed. 1979).
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public prosecutor rather than a private attorney, which results in
lower costs for the victim. Criminal prosecution is also a faster pro-
cess than civil litigation because there are no depositions, interroga-
tories, or requests for admissions. The deterrent effect of criminal
prosecution is a motivating factor for companies. "The average
trade secret thief is no hardened criminal, but rather an educated,
career-oriented professional who rationalizes situational thievery.
The possibility of prosecution and its consequences, including pub-
licity and unemployment, is more frightening than facing a mere
civil suit."6
The following hypothetical7 helps to illustrate how trade secret
criminal litigation begins' and what may happen once it is under
way. The founder of a highly successful electronics company leaves
that firm and forms a start-up company. The old firm contacts the
public prosecutor, charging that the founder took valuable trade
secrets with him and is using them in his new firm.9 After an inves-
tigation by the public prosecutor, the founder is charged with the
criminal theft of trade secrets. A local newspaper interested in run-
ning a series of articles on the high technology industry sends a
reporter to the preliminary hearing who discovers that the hearing
has been closed at the request of the defendant and agreed to by the
alleged victim.10 The newspaper then seeks to force the court to
open the hearing to the press and the general public.
Both the alleged victim and the defendant fear the conse-
6. Southard, To Catch a Thief, 6 CALIF. LAW. 23, 25 (Dec. 1986). Southard, a deputy
district attorney in Santa Clara County, California, notes that as an additional deterrent,
some employers specifically refer to Section 499c in employee non-disclosure agreements. See
supra note 3 for the text of Section 499c. See Southard's article for a discussion of criminal
prosecution in California.
7. The facts in this hypothetical are based on real events that occurred in 1979 in
California.
8. In the hypothetical the alleged victim contacted the prosecutor as soon as the new
company started business. In some situations the victimized company will conduct its own
detailed and lengthy investigation before turning to local law enforcement. An investigation
started by IBM through its own security agents of an employee suspected of stealing design
secrets from its hard disk drive technology led to that employee's prosecution and conviction.
People v. Serrata, 62 Cal. App. 3d 9, 133 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
Other times it is not the victim but a third party who reports trade secret theft to local
authorities. For example, an Intel employee approached a National Semiconductor Corpora-
tion (NSC) purchasing agent and offered to sell him some trade secrets. NSC alerted the
police and participated in the resulting undercover operation. People v. Superior Court
(Moore), 104 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 163 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1980), and People v. Gopal, 171 Cal.
App. 3d 524, 217 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1985).
9. Ownership of a trade secret does not give the owner monopoly in its use but merely
a proprietary right which equity protects against usurption by unfair means. Futurecraft
Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 283, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 207 (1962).
10. The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret and the property right in a trade
1987]
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quences of opening the preliminary hearing to the press. The al-
leged victim will lose his trade secret to the entire world if it is
disclosed at the hearing when the prosecutor shows what was sto-
len.11 Moreover, in presenting a defense, the defendant is also at
risk. He may be a holder of the same trade secret, which he ac-
quired by legitimate means or he may be a holder of a different
trade secret that produces the same result. Although the defendant
could be vindicated at trial, he may lose his valuable trade secret if
it is disclosed at the hearing while he is showing that he either ac-
quired it legitimately or developed it on his own. Thus each party
risks having his trade secret disclosed and thereby lost if the press is
allowed to attend the hearings.12 Yet, the press has a legitimate in-
terest in reporting interesting news to its readers.
In some instances, a third party may also fear the loss of trade
secrets through an open preliminary hearing. For example, in
Stamicarbon v. American Cyanamid Co.,13 the U.S. government
sued American Cyanamid (Cyanamid), a chemical producer, for vi-
olating a consent decree. Two of the competitors who were to tes-
tify at the trial were licensees of Stamicarbon and used its secret
processes as did Cyanamid. One of the competitors moved that its
testimony be received in camera in order to maintain the secrecy
required in the licensing agreement. The government agreed to the
procedure but Cyanamid objected. Stamicarbon then applied for a
preliminary injunction to prevent Cyanamid from disclosing Stami-
carbon's trade secrets by requiring receipt of the evidence in cam-
era. Stamicarbon also sued Cyanamid charging the Cyanamid,
pursuant to its license agreement with Stamicarbon, had to consent
to an in camera procedure.
The court of appeals held that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion when he denied a preliminary injunction on the grounds
that it was unlikely that Stamicarbon's secrets would be revealed at
secret ceases to exist after the secret has become public property through general disclosure.
Scharmer v. Carrolton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1975).
The owner of a trade secret must take precautions to protect the trade secret such as
disclosing the trade secret to only those employees, suppliers, licensees and others who need
to know and who pledge to keep it secret.
11. "[W]hile protective orders can bind juries, parties and court personnel, it is unclear
whether the media are bound in the same way. Such uncertainties have led victims to beg for
plea bargains in otherwise strong cases." Southard, supra note 6, at 25.
12. The issue of whether a constitutional taking has occurred when a trade secret is lost
because of an open proceeding is beyond the scope to this article. However, there is authority
for the idea that a trade secret could possibly be a form of property subject to the taking
regulation. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984)
13. Stamicarbon v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1974).
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the trial. The court also ruled that the license agreement, which
specified that Cyanamid reasonably use best efforts to prevent dis-
closure of Stamicarbon's trade secrets, did not constitute a waiver
by Cyanamid to a public trial. 4
The law remains unsettled as to whether trade secret prelimi-
nary hearings can be closed. The recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court (hereinafter
Press-Enterprise I1) offers guidelines for determining whether pre-
liminary hearings in general should be open. 5 In that case, a Cali-
fornia magistrate closed a 41-day preliminary hearing in a widely
reported murder case and sealed the transcript. Press-Enterprise
Company, a newspaper publisher, sought to have the transcript re-
leased. The California Supreme Court held that the preliminary
hearing could be closed since the defendant showed a "reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice" to the defendant's right to a fair
and impartial trial.16 The decision was appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise /1 and was reversed, the Court
holding that preliminary hearings of the type conducted in Califor-
nia were required to be open to public and press unless there was an
overriding interest articulated in the findings.17
Very few reported cases have dealt specifically with the issue of
closure of criminal trade secret cases at the pretrial or trial stage.
However, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, did
hold in Stamicarbon that the trial judge "does have the power at
least partially to restrict access to the contempt proceedings when
testimony which would reveal Stamicarbon secrets is received." 18
The focus of this article is whether the press has a constitu-
tional right to attend preliminary hearings in criminal trade secret
cases and how a balance can be struck between the First Amend-
ment rights of the press and the property rights of a private party.
The authors assert that in limited situations, parts of trade secret
preliminary hearings should be closed. This article concludes with
suggested guidelines for determining whether such hearings should
be closed.
14. Id at 538.
15. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986).
16. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 773, 781, 691 P.2d 1026, 1032,
209 Cal. Rptr. 360, 366.
17. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) (hereinafter Press-
Enterprise II).
18. Stamicarbon v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 541 (2d Cir. 1974).
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II. A QUALIFIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
SELECTED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Throughout our legal history, courts have recognized a
number of rights not specifically enumerated in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Many of these rights find their basis in the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution and are now considered fundamental
rights. Among the fundamental rights recognized are the rights to
travel, to marry, and to privacy. A relatively recently recognized
constitutional right, although not considered fundamental, is the
public's qualified right of access to judicial proceedings. 19
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the basic right of access in
Richmond Newspapers v. Commonwealth of Virginia: "[w]e hold
the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment."20 Although the holding garnered only a plural-
ity of the justices in Richmond,21 when the Supreme Court decided
Globe Newspaper Company v. Superior Court two years later in
1982, a majority of the justices held that the press and public have a
constitutional right of access to criminal trials.22 In Press Enterprise
II the Supreme Court recently extended this right of access to cer-
tain types of preliminary hearings.2" The general concept behind
the right of access to judicial proceedings is the notion of an in-
19. "The countervailing access theory asserts that the public's right to receive and dis-
seminate communications about public affairs implies at least some right to acquire relevant
information at the source. It draws on the right to assemble in places and at proceedings
traditionally public. It presumes the deterrent effect of public scrutiny on official misconduct.
And it emphasizes the unique role of the media in vindicating the right to know." San Jose
Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 502, 638 P.2d 655, 657, 179 Cal. Rptr.
772, 774 (1982).
20. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). In Richmond, a
newspaper publisher appealed the closing of a murder trial. The Virginia Supreme Court
denied the appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgement, holding that the First
Amendment guarantees the public a right to attend criminal trials but that the right may be
outweighed by an overriding interest articulated in the findings by the trial judge.
21. Justices White and Stevens joined Chief Justice Burger's opinion. Justice Brennan
filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Justices Stewart and Blackmun
each filed a concurring opinion. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
22. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604-605, (1982). In Globe, a
newspaper publisher challenged an order excluding the general public from the trial of a
defendant charged with raping three minor girls. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
construed a Massachusetts statute as requiring under all circumstances the exclusion of the
public during a sex offense trial which involved a minor victim. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that the statute violated the First Amendment because it required closure without a
finding of necessity by the trial judge.
23. In Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court held that there was a qualified right of
access to preliminary hearings as they are conducted in California. In California an accused
person has the right to a preliminary hearing before a neutral magistrate at which the accused
has "the right to personally appear at the hearing, to be represented by counsel, to cross-
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formed populace. If people are not exposed to the judicial system,
they will not understand how it works or have respect for the re-
sults achieved. The news media play a critical role in this process
by reporting judicial proceedings and publishing stories of interest
to the community. Since average citizens will not attend most judi-
cial proceedings because of time and financial constraints, the press
serves as their representative in the courtroom and is a means of
indirect access to the judiciary. Consequently, the press often seeks
admission to criminal trials and hearings perceived as news-
worthy. z4 But the courts, for a variety of reasons, will sometimes
deny the press access to the proceedings.
25
A. To What Judicial Proceedings Does The Qualified
Constitutional Right of Access Apply?
Deciding the proceedings to which the press have a constitu-
tional right of access has been no easy matter for the courts. "Sev-
eral concerns are to be weighed in deciding whether speech and
press freedoms imply the right of access to certain sources of gov-
ernment controlled information. Matters to be examined include
the traditional availability of the source to public scrutiny as well as
the relative benefits and burdens of recognizing access rights."26
Although the right to attend legal proceedings is partially deter-
mined by the type of the proceeding - i.e., trial, suppression hear-
ing, preliminary hearing, grand jury inquiry - the label of the
proceeding does not determine the public's right to attend.27
Rather, the courts look to the nature of the proceeding and the un-
derlying policies promoted by an open proceeding and balance these
policies against the potential harm which might arise from an open
proceeding.
1. Criminal trials
A number of policy considerations support the notion of a
First Amendment right of access to criminal trials. It is helpful to
examine hostile witnesses, to present exculpatory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained
evidence." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2742 (1986).
24. See, eg., San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 638 P.2d 655,
179 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1982); San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, petitioner's brief,
Docket No. C8296456; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
25. For example, certain parts of criminal proceedings have been closed to shield rape
victims from the trauma and embarrassment of public exposure.
26. San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 509, 638 P.2d 655,
662, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 779 (1982).
27. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) (Press-Enterprise
1987]
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identify and evaluate these policy concerns in order to later deter-
mine the extent to which these same concerns are applicable to pre-
trial settings in general and trade secret preliminary hearings in
particular. One established policy behind the notion of open access
is the tradition of public accessibility to criminal trials.28 Histori-
cally in the U.S. and in England, criminal trials have been open to
the public and the press. This tradition dates back to the time
before the Norman Conquest and was a fundamental concept which
the drafters of the U.S. Constitution supported.2 9 Modern courts
have agreed "that a presumption of openness is inherent in the very
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice."3 The U.S.
Supreme Court noted this presumption in Richmond and concluded
that "the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantee
of the First Amendment."31 The presumption was reiterated by the
Court as a critical concern in Globe.32
Another policy identified by the courts as a basis for upholding
the right of access to criminal trials is the encouragement of free
exchange of ideas.33 By attending criminal trials, the public and
press can freely exchange ideas and voice their opinions on news of
interest to their community. This exchange leads to an informed
discussion of government and a general education of the public.34
An open trial also fosters a public perception of fairness 35 and
ensures that the proceedings will in fact be just. The courts recog-
nize the psychological benefit to the community of an open trial: it
serves as an outlet for the emotions of the people and therapeuti-
cally satisfies "their natural yearning to see justice done - or even
the urge for retribution.... [No] community catharsis can occur if
justice is 'done in a corner or in any covert manner.' ,36 Access to
criminal proceedings also permits public scrutiny of the judicial
process and discourages secrecy and bias.37 It serves as a check and
balance on police procedures and tactics.3"
28. Id. at 2740.
29. Id Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-70 (1980).
30. Id at 573.
31. Id. at 580.
32. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
33. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584 (1980); U.S. v. Criden,
675 F.2d 550, 556-57 (3d Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Criden, see infra note 49.
34. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572, 584, 595-96 (1980).
35. Id at 569-70; U.S. v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982); Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
36. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980).
37. Id. at 569. U.S. v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982).
38. U.S. v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982).
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Generally, open criminal proceedings encourage and "enhance
the performance of all involved."39 Since judge, jury, and all parties
and attorneys are in public view, they will do their best to bring
about a fair result. Public access also meets the societal objective of
discouraging perjury ° since the witnesses will be within the full
view and scrutiny of the press and the public.
2. Pretrial Proceedings
a. A Brief History of the Right to Access
As described above, a qualified right of access exists with re-
spect to criminal trials. Whether a similar right exists in a particu-
lar type of pretrial hearing is not clear. Courts disagree on how
closely pretrial proceedings resemble a trial and on the social poli-
cies fostered by opening such proceedings. Specifically, authorities
disagree on how similar a preliminary hearing is to a trial and how
important it is in the criminal process. 4 ' Justice Blackmun's con-
curring and dissenting opinion in Gannett Company, Inc. v DePas-
quale,42 while maintaining that suppression hearings were critically
important and should be open, expressly distinguished the prelimi-
nary hearing by stating, "Such proceedings are not critical to the
criminal justice system in the way the suppression-of-evidence hear-
ing is and they are not close equivalents of the trial itself in form." 43
However, the California Supreme Court in San Jose Mercury-News
v Municipal Court stated that "preliminary hearings are a critical
step in the accusatory process"'  and that "when exclusion of evi-
dence is not at issue the preliminary hearing 'may turn out to be the
only judicial proceeding of substantial importance that takes place
39. Id. at 556. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 n. 7 (1980).
40. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596-97 (1980); U.S. v.
Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982).
41. Justice Stevens in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist in Press-Enter-
prise II noted that the historical evidence offered for recognizing a right of access to prelimi-
nary hearings was far less probative than in prior cases such as Richmond and Globe. "In
those cases, a common law tradition of openness at the time the First Amendment was rati-
fied suggested an intention and expectation on the part of the Framers and ratifiers that those
proceedings would remain presumptively open. In this case, however, it is uncontroverted
that a common law right of access did not inhere in preliminary proceedings at the time the
First Amendment was adopted and that the Framers and ratifiers of that provision could not
have intended such proceedings to remain open." Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court, 106
S. Ct. 2735, 2747 (1986).
42. 443 U.s. 368 (1979).
43. Id. at 437.
44. San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 510, 638 P.2d at 662,
179 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (1982).
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during a criminal prosecution.... ""s
Historically, there is no common law tradition of public at-
tendance at all pretrial proceedings. While acknowledging that the
common law traditions of public attendance at trials were embodied
in the Sixth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gannett found
no such tradition in the case of pretrial proceedings. "By the time
of adoption of the Constitution, public trials were clearly associated
with protection of the defendant, and pretrial proceedings, precisely
because of the same concern for a fair trial, were never character-
ized by the same degree of openness as were actual trials."
46
Gannett, a 1979 U.S. Supreme Court case, dealt with a pretrial
suppression of evidence proceeding. The Court held that Gannett,
a newspaper publisher, was not entitled to a right of access to the
pretrial hearing and based its analysis on the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of a public trial rather than the First Amendment.4 7
Although the majority opinion declined to decide in the abstract
whether there was a First Amendment right of access, it concluded
that the judge presiding over the suppression hearing had respected
any right of access the press might have had under the First
Amendment by balancing "the 'constitutional rights of the press
and the public'" against the "'defendant's right to a fair trial.' "248
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, explicitly found that under
the First Amendment the press possessed a qualified right of access
to pretrial proceedings and this right could be limited by the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial.4 9
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II con-
45. Id. at 511, 638 P.2d at 662, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 779. In spite of this recognition of the
importance of a preliminary hearing, the California Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 772, 691 P.2d 1026, 209 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1984) held that there is no
general right of access to preliminary hearings. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned this
California decision in Press-Enterprise II (Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court, 106 S. Ct.
2735 (1986)) and held that there is a qualified right of access to preliminary hearings.
46. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387-88 (1979).
47. The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment right did not extend to the public or
the press but only to the defendant. Since the defendant sought to close the hearing, the press
or public could not seek access based on his right to a public trial. Id.
48. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). The trial court found that "an
open proceeding would have a reasonable probability of prejudice to the defendants.'" Id. at
392-93. The Gannett majority did not comment on the test the trial court used, i.e., that a
reasonable probability of prejudice to a fair trial is enough to overcome the First Amendment
right of access. However, the Press-Enterprise II court said that the correct test was the
"substantial probability" test, not the "reasonable lildihood" test used by the California
Supreme Court. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2743 (1986).
49. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 398 (1979). Several lower courts ana-
lyzed the issue from a First Amendment standpoint and reached differing results. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in San Jose Mercury-News v Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 514,
[Vol. 3
TRADE SECRET PRELIMINAR Y HFARINGS
tinued Powell's line of reasoning and held that there is a qualified
right of access to certain preliminary hearings and outlined a consti-
tutional framework for analyzing the issue of closing preliminary
hearings.5 0 A general analysis of this constitutional framework ap-
pears below in part II(b). Part III of this article contains an analy-
sis of how courts might apply this constitutional framework
specifically in deciding whether to close trade secret preliminary
hearings. Part III also includes a discussion of how courts might
consider the closure guidelines of Stamicarbon, one of the few re-
ported cases focusing specifically on the protection of a trade secret
in preliminary proceedings.
b. A Constitutional Framework For Analyzing
Preliminary Hearings
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a 7-2 majority in Press-Enter-
prise II, outlined a two-part test for determining whether a prelimi-
nary hearing should be open or closed to the public. The first part
of the test requires an analysis of the tradition of accessibility to a
particular proceeding as practiced in that state. The second part of
the test focuses on the role public access plays in the particular pro-
cess in question.5 Although the opinion was based on a prelimi-
nary hearing in a murder case, it offers a framework for analyzing
all preliminary hearings since the only limiting language turns on
how extensive the preliminary hearing is in the particular state.52
638 P.2d 655, 179 Cal.Rptr. 772, (1982), held that the press had no First Amendment right of
access to a preliminary hearing.
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in U.S. v Criden, an ABSCAM criminal
prosecution, reached a contrary result and held "the public has a First Amendment right of
access to pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings." U.S. v. Criden, 675
F.2d 550, 554 (3d Cir. 1982). However, the Criden court did not think that "historical analy-
sis is relevant in determining whether there is a First Amendment right of access to pretrial
criminal proceedings." It relied on Blackmun's concurring and dissenting opinion in Gannett
where he points out that the common law had no equivalent of the modem suppression
hearing which was at issue in Gannett and Criden. The court turned its attention to inter-
preting the First Amendment "in light of current values and conditions" by analyzing the
societal policy interests which would be served by open pretrial criminal proceedings. Id. at
555. The Criden court in reaching its decision to open preliminary suppression, due process,
and entrapment hearings, stated that the societal interests supporting open access to public
trials that were articulated in Richmond "are also present in the context of a pretrial criminal
proceeding and support a First Amendment right to attend such proceedings." Id at 556.
50. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) (Press-Enterprise
I).
51. Id.
52. See Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II)
for a discussion of the extensive scope of a preliminary hearing in California.
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1) The Tradition Of Accessibility To Preliminary
Hearings
An analysis of the tradition of accessibility to preliminary hear-
ings must focus on "whether the place and process has been open to
the press and general public."53 Initially, a court must look to the
tradition of accessibility in the particular state where the prelimi-
nary hearing takes place. The Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II
focused on preliminary hearings in California 4 and found a strong
tradition of accessibility. 5 The Court also noted that the "vast ma-
jority of States considering the issue have concluded that the same
tradition of accessibility that applies to criminal trials applies to
preliminary proceedings."5 6
2) The Role Of Public Access In The Function Of
A Preliminary Hearing
The second part of the test outlined in Press-Enterprise II fo-
cuses on "whether public access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process in question. '57 This issue
requires an in depth analysis of how the particular process, here the
preliminary hearing, actually functions in the state in question and
what underlying policies the process actually fosters. It is impor-
tant to note that "the First Amendment question cannot be resolved
solely on the label we give the event, i.e., 'trial' or otherwise, partic-
ularly where the preliminary hearing functions much like a full
scale trial."5 8
The Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II summarized a
number of policies promoted by open preliminary hearings: the ex-
change of ideas and education of the public; the notion of funda-
mental fairness and therapeutic value of enforcement; the role the
public plays in the absence of a jury at a preliminary hearing; and
the checks and balances on police procedures.5 9 In reviewing these
policies, the Court stated: "[w]e have already determined in Rich-
mond Newspapers, Globe, and Press Enterprise I that public access
53. Id at 2740.
54. See supra note 23 for a description of the type of preliminary hearing held in
California.
55. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II).
56. Id. note 3, at 2741.
57. Id at 2740.
58. Id at 9.
59. Other policies mentioned by other courts include discouragement of perjury (Bren-
nan in a concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596-97,
(1980)) and deterrence of crime.
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to criminal trials and the selection of jurors is essential to the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system. California preliminary
hearings are sufficiently like a trial to justify the same conclusion."'
After applying the two-part test (the tradition of accessibility
to the proceeding and the role of public access to the functioning of
the proceeding) the Supreme Court held "The qualified first amend-
ment right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary
hearings as they are conducted in California."'" However, the deci-
sion to open a preliminary hearing is not complete after satisfying
the two-part test. Rather, the court must then consider whether the
particular hearing fits within any of the constitutional limits on the
right of access.62
B. Limits On The Constitutional Right Of Access
There are limits on the First Amendment constitutional right
of access. As Justice Brennan noted in Richmond, "any privilege of
access to government information is subject to a degree of restraint
dictated by the nature of information and countervailing interests in
security or confidentiality"63 and "the right of access may be cur-
tailed when there are sufficiently powerful countervailing considera-
tions."" The Supreme Court in Richmond applied strict scrutiny
in its analysis of the public's right to attend criminal trials. "Absent
an overriding interest articulated in the findings, the trial of a crimi-
nal case must be open to the public."' 65 Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, articulated the same standard of scrutiny in Globe:
"Where, as in the present case, the state attempts to deny the right
of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information,
it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling
government interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest."' 66
The rule in Press-Enterprise I1 requires the trial court to "de-
termine whether the situation is such that the rights of the accused
override the qualified First Amendment right of access."'67 This
60. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2742 (1986) (Press Enterprise
II). See supra note 20 for a discussion of Richmond. See supra note 22 for a discussion of
Globe. See infra note 67 for a discussion of Press-Enterprise I.
61. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2743 (1986)(Press-Enterprise
II).
62. Id.
63. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 (1980).
64. Id. at 593, n. 18.
65. Id. at 581.
66. Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982).
67. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2741 (1986) (Press-Enterprise
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requirement mandates a two-part analysis: first, the proceedings
cannot be closed unless specific findings demonstrate that "closure
is essential to preserve higher values;"68 and second, the closure
must be "narrowly tailored to serve that interest."69 If the interest
asserted is that of a fair trial, it must be shown that there is "sub-
stantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be
prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent." 7 Also, if a
fair trial interest is asserted, it must be shown that reasonable alter-
natives other than closure will not protect the defendant's rights.71
III. APPLYING THE Press-Enterprise II TEST To TRADE
SECRET PRELIMINARY HEARINGS
Now that we have described a general constitutional frame-
work for determining whether preliminary hearings should be
closed, we turn to how this framework could be applied to a crimi-
nal trade secret preliminary hearing. This requires an analysis of
three issues: (1) the tradition of accessibility in trade secret hear-
ings; (2) the role of public accessibility in the functioning of trade
secret hearings; and (3) the limits on the constitutional right of ac-
cess in trade secret preliminary hearings.
A. Tradition Of Accessibility To Trade Secret
Preliminary Hearings
Press-Enterprise II requires courts to consider the tradition of
accessibility to preliminary hearings in the particular state in ques-
tion. However, Press-Enterprise II focused on a preliminary hearing
to determine whether probable cause existed to proceed to trial
against a nurse charged with murdering twelve patients. Trade se-
cret crimes do not usually provoke the public concern, outrage or
hostility as with violent crimes. Therefore, there is less incentive to
open trade secret preliminary hearings to provide an outlet for the
I). This requirement was also stated in Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501
(1984) (Press-Enterprise I).
In Press-Enterprise I a newspaper publisher appealed a trial court's closure of voir dire
proceedings at a trial for the rape and murder of a teenage girl. The California Court of
Appeal denied the publisher's petition to vacate the order closing the voir dire proceedings,
and the California Supreme Court denied the publisher's request for a hearing. The U.S.
Supreme Court found that a trial court could not constitutionally close voir dire examination
of potential jurors without considering alternatives to closure.
68. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2743 (1986) (Press-Enterprise
II); Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I).
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public's reactions and emotions. Trade secret litigants should argue
that an open preliminary hearing would not serve the purpose of the
preliminary hearing as in Press-Enterprise I1 because public interest
is much more limited. Additionally, trade secret holders should
emphasize the very real potential loss of trade secrets if the prelimi-
nary hearing is an open proceeding.
Press-Enterprise 11 made no exception for the particular subject
matter of a preliminary hearing. Since the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cided Press-Enterprise II so recently, it is unclear precisely how far
the holding will be extended. While a court could easily find that a
trade secret preliminary hearing met the first part of the test, the
crucial determination comes in the second part of the test where the
court must consider the role of public access in the function of pre-
liminary hearings.
B. Role Of Public Access In The Functioning Of Trade
Secret Preliminary Hearings
Courts agree that open preliminary hearings promote a
number of different social policies. Among them are the exchange
of ideas and education of the public, the notion of fundamental fair-
ness and the therapeutic value of enforcement, the discouragement
of perjury, the role the public plays in the absence of a jury at pre-
liminary hearings, the checks and balances on police procedures,
and the deterrence of crime.72
One social policy promoted by open preliminary proceedings is
that they encourage the exchange of ideas and information. Open
trade secret preliminary hearings support this policy because the
public will learn more about the business practices of companies in
their community and as a result will better understand proper busi-
ness ethics and norms of behavior.
However, the education of the public may include the educa-
tion of competitors as to valuable trade secrets. Perhaps the public
could be just as well educated on proper business practices by read-
ing news stories summarizing the outcome of the proceedings, in-
cluding comments by participants, industry observers and teachers
of business ethics.
72. Id. at 2742-43. The Press-Enterprise I decision also recognized the value of open
proceedings. "The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials
can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that
anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and
that deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system."
Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (Emphasis in original).
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Another policy the courts consider is that the presence of the
press and public acts as a check on corruption of judicial practices.
If they are excluded from the trade secret preliminary hearing, pub-
lic confidence in the system may wane because the public may be-
lieve that the trade secret holder and the prosecutor bartered away
justice.
The public also benefits from the therapeutic value of knowing
that criminal trade secret theft law is being enforced. However, the
Stamicarbon court recognized that although a benefit "accrues to
the public at large from the publicity of criminal proceedings.., it
must be acknowledged that the marginal benefit of increased public
confidence which would accrue from unrestricted access in this case
certainly does not counterbalance [plaintiff's] interest in secrecy."73
Justice Stevens noted in Richmond that "the preservation of trade
secrets might justify the exclusion of the public from at least some
segment of a civil trial."'74 Although, his comment referred to civil
trials, this reasoning could be extended to justify the exclusion of
the public from some segments of criminal trade secret preliminary
hearings.
The notion of discouraging perjury and the role the public
plays in the absence of a jury may be important in the trade secret
context. An open preliminary hearing affords the public an oppor-
tunity to view the proceedings and allows anyone with knowledge
of the circumstances to expose perjury as it might arise. On the
other hand, because highly technical trade secrets are typically un-
derstood only by people with special expertise, the opportunity for
perjury to be exposed is outweighed by the probability that trade
secrets will be revealed. Press-Enterprise II indicated that public
attendance at preliminary hearings safeguards against improper ju-
dicial application of the law or an overzealous prosecutor.75 In a
trade secret hearing, the court will have to balance these potential
benefits against the significant potential loss of trade secrets.
Access of the press to preliminary hearings also serves as a
check on police procedures. In investigating trade secret theft the
police, because they are not expert in a certain technical area, may
use employees of the alleged victim to assist in searches by identify-
ing allegedly stolen trade secrets.76 This procedure can be abused
73. Stamicarbon v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 542 n. 15 (2d Cir. 1974).
74. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 600 n. 5 (1980).
75. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2743 (1986) (Press-Enter-
prise II).
76. In People v. Superior Court (Moore), 104 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 163 Cal. Rptr. 906
(1980), police officers, who were unable to identify items discribed in a search warrant, were
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because it allows the employees, whose feelings and intentions may
not be neutral, to rummage through the suspect's property. The
employees may be hostile toward the suspect because he left a for-
mer employer or because they were not asked to join the suspect's
start-up company. Employees may also be interested, for intellec-
tual and other reasons, in learning about the suspect's confidential
and proprietary information. The opening of a preliminary trade
secret criminal hearing would afford the public the opportunity to
scrutinize police conduct in executing the search warrant. The
Third Circuit in U.S. v Criden recognized the important role that
the public plays at pretrial hearings in scrutinizing police conduct:
"the pretrial hearing may be the only point in the trial process at
which the conduct of law enforcement officers is at issue."
7 7
However, even if an open hearing discloses some abusive con-
duct in carrying out the search warrant, it may further compound
the injury to the defendant by disclosing his trade secrets. A closed
hearing would protect trade secrets and still allow close scrutiny of
police conduct by the defendant and the court.
Open preliminary hearings also serve as a deterrent to crime.
If trade secret preliminary hearings were open to the public and
reported widely, potential trade secret thieves might see that the law
was being enforced. Because most people who appropriate trade
secrets do not think of themselves as thieves in a criminal sense, an
open preliminary hearing may educate and deter them. However,
even if the preliminary hearing is closed while sensitive information
is disclosed, the press will still report the salient facts of the case if
so inclined.
C. Limits On The Constitutional Right of Access in Trade
Secret Preliminary Hearings
Press-Enterprise 11 makes it clear that any right of access to a
preliminary hearing is a qualified right. Because the right of access
is a First Amendment right, courts can deny access only if an over-
riding or compelling interest exists and findings show that closure
of a trade secret preliminary hearing "is essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'78  We now
accompanied by experts who were employees of the victim company. The experts conducted
the search under the direction of the police.
77. 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982).
78. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2743 (1986) (Press-Enter-
prise II); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (Press-Enterprise
D).
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turn to an analysis of potential compelling interests of trade secret
holders that may limit the First Amendment right of the press or
public to attend trade secret preliminary hearings.
1. Closure Of A Trade Secret Preliminary Hearing
Must Be Essential To Preserve Higher Values
A crucial determination for any court faced with closing a
trade secret preliminary hearing is an analysis of the compelling in-
terest at stake in each case. If an open hearing would cause undue
prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial, courts have little
difficulty finding this a compelling interest.79 However, Press-En-
terprise II indicates that any defendant, presumably including trade
secret defendants, have to show that there is a substantial
probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial would be
prejudiced and that reasonable alternatives other than closure will
not protect the defendant's rights.8" This can be a difficult task.
Some of the factors the courts consider when determining
whether to close a judicial proceeding are "the nature and extent of
the publicity a public hearing might generate, its probable effect on
the jury pool, the effectiveness of closure as a means of preventing
prejudice, and the availability of alternative means."81 Inflam-
matory or misleading publicity generated by the press about a trade
secret preliminary hearing cannot be nullified in the same way that
publicity can be at a trial. The Supreme Court in Gannett recog-
nized this problem: "[a]fter the commencement of the trial itself,
inadmissible prejudicial information about the defendant can be
kept from the jury by a variety of means. When such information is
publicized during a pretrial proceeding, however, it may never be
altogether kept from potential jurors. Closure of pretrial proceed-
ings is often one of the most effective methods that a trial judge can
79. The Supreme Court said in Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976),
that free-speech and fair-trial values have equal importance. As the California Supreme
Court noted, balancing these two compelling interests is difficult: "The balance becomes par-
ticularly delicate when public access may endanger competing rights of substantially equal
import." San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 510, 638 P.2d 655,
662, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 779 (1982). However, the same court recognized that restrictions on
the right of access are legitimate means of protecting fair-trial rights. Its rationale: "The
right to observe is distinct from the right to speak and write about one has seen and heard.
Denial of access differs from a prior restraint on publication of known information." Id. at
502 n. 3.
80. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) (Press-Enterprise
II).
81. San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 512, 638 P.2d 655,
663-54, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 781 (1982).
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employ to insure that the fairness of a trial will not be jeopardized
by the dissemination of such information throughout the commu-
nity before the trial itself has even begun."
82
Inflammatory or misleading publicity is not the only prejudi-
cial effect the press can create in a trade secret preliminary hearing.
Even factual, relevant reporting of a major trade secret case may be
prejudicial if it produces a jury pool whose members believe that a
defendant's guilt has already been determined. Sometimes only the
prosecutor presents testimony and evidence at a preliminary hear-
ing. The defendant may not present his side because he does not
know what the prosecutor's strategy and evidence are until the pre-
liminary hearing. Also, since the main purpose of the preliminary
hearing is to establish probable cause, the defense, if it appears that
probable cause has been established, may present little or no evi-
dence. Because of the nature of a preliminary hearing, the press can
unintentionally create the conclusion in the minds of the public that
the defendant is guilty when it reports what occurred at the pro-
ceeding. The public may not appreciate the separate purposes of a
preliminary hearing (to establish probable cause) and a trial (to de-
termine guilt or innocence). They may attribute the credibility of a
trial to a preliminary hearing or infer from a defendant's silence an
admission of guilt.
Courts should also consider whether the economic harm
caused by the loss of the trade secret is a potential overriding inter-
est that could limit the public's right to attend a trade secret prelim-
inary hearing. This loss may fall not only on the shoulders of the
defendant, but also on the victim or innocent third parties, such as
licensors of the trade secret, or even the community as a whole if
the loss of the trade secret threatened jobs or economic prosperity.
Whether economic harm to the general community or to individual
trade secret holders is a compelling interest or not is undecided. If
courts eventually do agree that an economic interest can be compel-
ling, they are more likely to accept broad economic harm of the
type alluded to in Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. Public Utili-
ties Commission of California.83 There, members of the Supreme
Court indicated that the state may have a compelling interest in the
regulation of utility rates to avoid widespread economic harm as to
a community, rather than economic harm to a specific individual,
82. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-79 (1979).
83. In Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. Public Utilities Commission of California,
106 S. Ct. 903, 913 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in dicta that an economic
interest may rise to a compelling interest. Ida
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such as a trade secret holder. Consequently, trade secret owners
seeking to close the entire hearing should focus on wide-spread eco-
nomic loss that would effect entire communities, such as plant clos-
ings and massive unemployment, rather than specific monetary loss
to the trade secret owner. The situations in which courts have fa-
vored closed proceedings, such as cases involving trial prejudice, the
rape of minors and classified government information, indicate how
compelling the government interest must be.
Another potential compelling interest that trade secret litigants
should argue is the interest in encouraging the reporting and pun-
ishing of crimes.84 Open trade secret preliminary hearings may dis-
courage a trade secret victim from reporting the theft because the
victim fears losing the trade secret in an open hearing. If the crime
is not reported, it can not be punished. Courts will probably be
receptive to this argument given its strong policy underpinnings.
2. Closure Of A Trade Secret Hearing Must Be
Narrowly Tailored
Closure of an entire trade secret proceeding is not warranted if
the governmental interest can be protected in a less intrusive man-
ner. The Stamicarbon Court suggests several less onerous alterna-
tives85 to closing criminal trade secret cases to be considered when
evaluating less restrictive alternatives to closure. Among the nar-
rower means suggested are: excluding those who have an interest in
the trade secret information; restricting attendance to a smaller
number of witnesses than normal; putting attendees under oath not
to disclose the details of the trade secrets;86 and holding parts of
the proceedings in camera, such as that part of the proceeding deal-
ing with the nature and benefits of the trade secret. Some or all of
these alternatives might serve to protect the trade secret owner
while assuring the public and press the right of access to the
proceedings.
The best balance between the preservation of trade secrets and
the basic First Amendment right of access is struck by closing a
preliminary hearing only during the portions of testimony pertain-
ing to the actual details of the trade secrets. The court could be
84. In Garrett v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 2407, 2421 (1985), Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion recognized this interest as a "compelling public interest in punishing
crimes."
The majority opinion in Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1700 (1985) also recog-
nized the "governmental interests in effective law enforcement."
85. Stamicarbon v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 541 (2d Cir. 1974).
86. See, supra note 10.
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cleared of persons not connected with the parties involved and the
trade secret portions of the testimony could be sealed 7 and kept
confidential by the parties, the parties' attorneys, and the parties'
agents and employees. In addition, any portions of the testimony
during the closed session not involving trade secrets could later be
disclosed. By closing the hearing for only a brief time and by dis-
closing the non-confidential parts of the testimony, the court would
employ the least restrictive means available to preserve the confi-
dentiality of legitimate and important trade secrets.88
To determine which parts of a preliminary hearing should be
closed, courts should consider adapting the procedure used in civil
trade secret litigation outlined in California's recently enacted Uni-
form Trade Secret Act. 9 The Act amended the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure to require the party alleging misappropriation to "identify
the trade secrets with reasonable particularity" prior to commenc-
ing discovery. 90 In the criminal trade secrets context, this concept
should be adapted to require particular identification of all the trade
secrets at stake at an early stage of the proceedings. The court
87. The Press-Enterprise I court suggested a similar procedure for employing the least
restrictive means in sensitive voir dire situations. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464
U.S. 501, 512 (1984).
88. The question may arise as to whether the press has a right of access on First
Amendment grounds to the trade secrets testified to in the sealed testimony. In a matter of
first impression in Standard & Poor's Corporation v. Commodity Exchange, 541 F. Supp.
1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), a district court in New York addressed the issue in a civil suit. A
trade newspaper service, Commodity News Services (News Services) sought an order un-
sealing the transcript of the closed portion of a hearing in which Standard & Poor's (s & P)
asked for a preliminary injunction to stop Commodity Exchange (Comex) from using S & P's
trademarks and trade names. By agreement with the defendant Comex, S&P presented cer-
tain trade secret information in a closed session. News Services argued that "constitutional
principal [overcame] business confidentiality in this case." Id. at 1274. News Services con-
tended "that it had an absolute enforceable right of open access to all that occurred in the
administration of this civil case at the time it occurred." Id.
Denying News Services' claim, the court stated that "An interference with access to
business confidences and trade secrets is not an abridgement of the freedom of speech and of
the press protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 1275. The court applied the Stami-
carbon standard, reasoning that "the overriding interest to be found in business confidences
- protected by law as trade secrets - required a temporary reasonably restricted access to
the Courtroom of members of the public." Id.
By analogy, the same rationale the court used in S & P should be used in determining if
transcripts of sealed testimony in trade secret preliminary hearings should be released.
89. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426 (West 1984).
90. "In any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret under the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (Title 5 (commencing with Section 3426) of Part 1 of Division 4 of the
Civil Code), before commencing discovery relating to the trade secret under Chapter 2 (com-
mencing with Section 1985) or Article 3 (commencing with Section 2016) of Chapter 3 of this
title, the party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable
particularity subject to any orders which may be appropriate under Section 3426.5 of the
Civil Code." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2036.2 (West).
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could then determine the extent of access that should be permitted
to a preliminary hearing - that is, whether it should be open com-
.pletely, partially or not at all. In making the determination, the
court should apply the Stamicarbon standard: in a trade secret
case, limited in camera proceedings are appropriate if a trade secret
holder "was likely to suffer irreparable injury, and that protection
of its secrets could be achieved with minimal disruption of the crim-
inal proceedings."91 What is critical about this statement is its lim-
ited nature. Irreparable injury must be likely and the in camera
proceeding must not disrupt the ends of justice. The Stamicarbon
court pointed out that the fact situation it faced (a contempt hear-
ing) presented a stronger case for closing the proceeding because the
defendant only faced a small monetary fine and "the precarious bal-
ance between private claims and the constitutional right to a public
trial may be struck more easily when the accused is not faced with
the loss of liberty." 92 In states where imprisonment is a potential
penalty for criminal trade secret theft, it is even more important to
narrowly tailor any closure of trade secret preliminary hearings be-
cause of the potential loss of liberty.93
IV. CONCLUSION
Prosecutions under criminal trade secret statutes will inevita-
bly lead to clashes between the press claiming a right of access to
the preliminary hearing and the trade secret owners, for whom,
ironically, the statutes were passed to protect, moving for closure in
order to prevent disclosure and loss of trade secrets. Unyielding
enforcement of the right of access leads to unfortunate results: theft
victims could be forced to choose between having their trade secrets
broadcast during criminal proceedings or allowing theft to go un-
prosecuted. Completely closing trade secret preliminary hearings,
on the other hand, conflicts with the First Amendment right of the
public and press to attend criminal proceedings. Neither extreme
provides an equitable solution. Instead, courts should seek an ac-
commodation between the competing interests in order to protect
the trade secret owner while assuring the public and press a quali-
fied right of access to trade secret preliminary hearings.
91. Stamicarbon v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 540 (2d Cir. 1974).
92. Id.
93. For example, under California Penal Code Section 499(c) a person convicted of
stealing trade secrets can be sentenced to a one-year prison term in the state prison or the
county jail. The Moore and Gopal cases (supra note 8) "resulted in state prison for one
defendent and county jail for two others." Southard, supra note 6, at 24.
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